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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996) this Court has jurisdiction over
the appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff-appellant Holmes

Development, LLC's ("Holmes") breach of warranty claims in that any purported breach
was corrected prior to the time that there were any alleged damages and wherein the
alleged damages were caused by the actions of entities other than defendant-appellees
Paul Cook and Cook Development, LC ("Cook Development") (collectively, "Cook"). In
reviewing this grant of summary judgment, the Court accords no deference to the trial
court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Harline v. Barken 912 P.2d 433, 438
(Utah 1996). The Court determines whether the trial court erred in applying the
governing law and whether it correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material
fact. Id. (citations omitted). The court may affirm the trial court on any ground available
to it, whether or not the grounds were relied upon below. Id. (citations omitted).
2.

Whether Holmes' receipt of good title and the successful defense of such

title by defendant-appellee First American Title Insurance Company ("First American")
provided Holmes the only remedies available for an asserted breach of warranty, thus
precluding Holmes' claim for damages. In reviewing this grant of summary judgment,
the Court accords no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented.
-1-

Harline v. Barken 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). The Court determines whether the
trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether it correctly held that there
were no disputed issues of material fact. Id. (citations omitted). The court may affirm the
trial court on any ground available to it, whether or not the grounds were relied upon
below. Id. (citations omitted).
3.

Whether the trial court properly dismissed Holmes' claims on the ground

that the damages alleged by Holmes were not within the scope of the Indemnity
Agreement. Further, even if the scope of the Indemnity Agreement was broader, whether
the dismissal was proper because the damages alleged arose after the conveyance of good
title and were caused by parties other than Paul Cook and Cook Development. In
reviewing this grant of summary judgment, the Court accords no deference to the trial
court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438
(Utah 1996). The Court determines whether the trial court erred in applying the
governing law and whether it correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material
fact. Id. (citations omitted). The court may affirm the trial court on any ground available
to it, whether or not the grounds were relied upon below. Id. (citations omitted).
4.

Whether the trial court properly denied Holmes' request for leave to amend

which request was set forth in its memorandum opposing Cook's motion to dismiss, but
which request was not set forth by motion. This Court should not disturb the trial court's
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denial of Holmes' request to amend "absent a clear abuse of discretion which exceeds the
limits of reasonability." Neztsosie v. Mever. 883 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
[T]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This action pertains to a real estate transaction wherein Cook Development sold a
323 acre parcel of property by way of warranty deed to Holmes in April 1998. The
aforesaid parcel (the "Property") was the subject of residential development. In
connection with this transaction, Cook signed an Indemnity Agreement relative to the
indemnification of Holmes under certain specified circumstances. Following the
discovery by First American of a potential defect in the chain of title relative to the
Property, Cook immediately took all steps necessary to cure such potential defect, which
alleged defect was cured by at least September 3, 1998.
Two non-parties to this litigation, Premier Homes, L.C. ("Premier") and Keystone
Development, L.C. ("Keystone"), entered into a sham transaction in November 1998 in
which Premier purported to convey to Keystone the Property. On the same day,
-3-

November 25, 2001, Keystone filed a quiet title action against appellant Holmes claiming
ownership of the Property and Keystone also filed a lis pendens. Pursuant to a title policy
purchased by Cook Development, appellee First American defended the title to the
Property in the case of Keystone Development LC v. Holmes Development L.L.C.; First
American Title Insurance Company: Bank One Utah. N.A.; John Does 1 through 30
inclusive. Fourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch County, Utah, Civil No. 980500389
(the "Keystone Litigation"). In the Keystone Litigation it was determined as a matter of
law that good title was held by Holmes pursuant to a Special Warranty Deed dated
September 3, 1998.
Holmes asserts that it was damaged as a direct result of the Keystone Litigation
and the lis pendens filed by Keystone. Rather than suing Premier and Keystone for their
collusive actions and for Keystone's non-meritorious lawsuit and its filing of a lis
pendens, Holmes filed suit against appellees Cook and First American. Holmes' claims
against Cook were based on negligence (first cause of action), breach of warranty (fourth
cause of action), and indemnification of damages resulting from appellees' (Cook's and
First American's) negligence (fifth cause of action). The trial court found that the
economic loss doctrine precluded any economic damage recovery against appellees on
Holmes' claim of negligence. The breach of warranty claims were dismissed in that any
breach of warranty which may have existed was cured prior to the time that Keystone
filed its action against Holmes along with its lis pendens and no damages were alleged by
-4-

Holmes to have occurred prior to good title being conveyed. Holmes' claim for
indemnification of damages resulting from appellees' alleged negligence was dismissed
in that the claim was outside the scope of the Indemnification Agreement. Further, there
was no showing of cognizable damage. Holmes has appealed the trial court's ruling on
summary judgment.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition By The Trial Court
Holmes filed its complaint against Cook and First American on October 20, 1999
(R. 1-19). The claims against Cook were denominated as negligence, breach of warranty
and indemnification. Other claims against First American were breach of contract/third
party beneficiary and negligent misrepresentation. First American filed its Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment on November 29, 1999 (R.
23-42). Holmes filed its opposition on January 5, 2000 and on January 21, 2000 First
American filed its reply (R. 78-153). Cook also filed a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment dated February 11, 2000 (R. 159-215). Holmes filed its opposition to the
motion on March 23, 2000 and Cook filed a reply dated April 4, 2000 (R. 231-253). The
trial court entered a summary judgment dismissing all of Holmes' claims against First
American on May 18, 2000 and on August 2, 2000 the trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of Cook on all claims. On August 24, 2000 Holmes filed its notice of
appeal.

-5-

Statement of Facts
1.

Cook Development is a Utah limited liability company. Paul Cook, an

individual, is the principal owner and registered agent for Cook Development.
(Complaint ffl| 2-3, R. 2.)
2.

In 1993 large parcels of land near Heber City, Utah were purchased by Paul

Cook with the intention of developing the land for residential building purposes. This
land totaled over 400 acres and was eventually transferred to Cook Development. The
development was named Lake Creek Farms. (Complaintffl]9-10, R. 3.)
3.

Development for residential building lots proceeded for sale in two phases.

Phase I consisted of approximately 32 individual lots and was sold out in 1996. Phase II
consisted of 40 lots, for which sales began to be offered in 1997, and by 1998
approximately 34 of the 40 lots had been sold. (Complaint ^ 11-12, R. 3.)
4.

Cook Development associated with another real estate developer by the

name of Premier. The primary owner of Premier was John Thomas ("Mr. Thomas").
(Complaintffi[14-15, R. 4.)
5.

In late October 1997 Cook Development and Premier formed two limited

liability companies, Le. Lake Creek Farms, LC (,fLC Farms") and Lake Creek Associates,
LC ("LC Associates"). Cook Development conveyed by Warranty Deed a 323 acre
parcel to LC Farms and a 73 acre parcel to LC Associates. (Complaint ^ 17-18, R. 4.)

-6-

6.

For several months Premier and Cook Development attempted to find new

financing for the Lake Creek Farms development. (Complaint <f 21, R. 4.)
7.

The new financing was not obtained and Cook Development and Premier

agreed to part ways. In so doing it was agreed that deeds would be executed on behalf of
LC Farms and LC Associates conveying the 323 and 73 acre parcels back to Cook
Development. (Complaintfflf22-23, R. 5.)
8.

In order to effectuate the transfer of the parcels back to Cook Development,

two deeds were necessary and it was the intent that LC Farms would quit claim its interest
in the 323 acre parcel to Cook Development and that LC Associates would quit claim its
interest in the 73 acre parcel to Cook Development. (Complaint ^ 25, R. 5.)
9.

Paul Cook contacted First American at its Heber City office to handle the

transfer. He requested that quit claim deeds be prepared. The Heber City Office of First
American was intimately familiar with the Lake Creek Farms development as First
American had issued all of the title insurance policies and conducted all the closings
associated with the lot sales in Phases I and II. Further, First American had handled the
closing and issued the title insurance policy to Paul Cook when he originally acquired the
property in 1993. (Complaint Iflf 26-29, R. 5-6.)
10.

Thus, in March, 1998 First American's Heber City Office prepared two quit

claim deeds which were signed by Paul Cook and Mr. Thomas and which were also
recorded the same month at the request of First American. As to these two quit claim
-7-

deeds, First American did not issue a title insurance policy nor did it issue a title
insurance commitment. (Complaint % 30, R. 6.)
11.

The quit claim deed which conveyed the 323 acre parcel from LC Farms to

Cook Development contained a typographical error in that the deed named LC
Associates as the grantor instead of LC Farms in whose name the parcel was titled.
(Complaintfflf18, 31-32, R. 4, 6.)
12.

The quit claim deed for the 73 acre parcel properly showed LC Associates

as grantor. (Complaint ^ 33, R. 6.)
13.

Thereafter, Cook Development obtained certain financing from Clark Real

Estate and used the 323 and 73 acre parcels as collateral. In connection with the loan,
First American was asked to prepare a title insurance commitment report and issue a title
insurance policy to Clark Real Estate. First American prepared a deed of first trust and
promissory note and closed the loan of over one million dollars ($1,000,000.00).
(Complaintfflj34-38, R. 6-7.)
14.

Thereafter, Cook Development proceeded to seek a buyer for the entire

project and Holmes became interested in purchasing Lake Creek Farms in April 1998.
(Complaint % 39, R. 7.)
15.

A contract was entered into between Holmes and Cook Development

wherein Holmes agreed to purchase both the 323 and 73 acre parcels as well as a few
remaining lots in Phase II of the development. First American was again retained to
-8-

prepare a title insurance commitment report and issue a title insurance policy to Holmes.
This was handled by the Heber City Office of First American. First American prepared
the necessary deeds and closing documents as well as conducted the closing. Holmes was
instructed to sign a form entitled "Acknowledgment of Receipt of Commitment for Title
Insurance". (Complaintffi|39 - 41, 44, R. 7-8.)
16.

Thus, in May 1998 Holmes purchased the Lake Creek Farms Development

from Cook Development for approximately three million six hundred thousand dollars
($3,600,000.00). (Complaint U 43, R. 8.)
17.

Cook Development conveyed the Lake Creek Farms development to

Holmes by way of warranty deed. An Indemnity Agreement was signed by Paul Cook
and Cook Development dated effective May 19, 1998. (Complaint % 46, R. 8, 180-181.)
18.

After completing the purchase process, Holmes sought additional financing

from Bank One of Utah ("Bank One"). The services of First American's Salt Lake City
office were retained by Bank One to prepare the necessary trust deed and title insurance
documents associated with the loan to Holmes. It was during this process that First
American's Salt Lake City office discovered sometime in July 1998 that the quit claim
deed for the 323 acre parcel had a typographical error and did not name the correct

-9-

grantor (i.e., the quit claim deed had LC Associates rather than LC Farms). (Complaint
UK 48-50, R.9.) 1
19-

First American alerted Cook Development, Paul Cook and Holmes

concerning this matter and also contacted Mr. Thomas of Premier and requested that Mr.
Thomas and Paul Cook execute a new quit claim deed which would properly name LC
Farms as the grantor of the 323 acre parcel. (Complaintfflj50-51, R. 9.)
20.

Mr. Thomas, however, refused to execute a new deed. Paul Cook and Cook

Development at all times stood ready and willing to remedy the deed. (Complaint KH 5253, R. 9.)
21.

Since First American could not obtain Mr. Thomas' cooperation to remedy

the deed matter, First American prepared a special warranty deed for Cook
Development's execution whereby LC Farms was to deed the 323 acre parcel to Holmes.
The deed was to be signed by Paul Cook in his capacity as the member and manager of
Cook Development which was a member of LC Farms. (Complaint ^J 54, R. 10.)
22.

The signature block in the special warranty deed prepared by First

American for Paul Cook showed that Mr. Cook was signing in his individual capacity as a
member of LC Farms instead of in his capacity as the manager of Cook Development
which was a member of LC Farms. This special warranty deed was signed on September

1

While paragraph 50 of the Complaint recites July 1999, it is clear from the
context of the other allegations of the Complaint that July 1998 is the proper date.
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3, 1998 by Paul Cook. Later, an affidavit was signed by Mr. Cook indicating that his
signature was in his capacity as member and manager of Cook Development. (Complaint
1H 55-58, R. 10.)
23.

In late November 1998, Mr. Thomas purported to cause the sale or transfer

of the aforesaid 323 acre parcel from Premier to Keystone. A warranty deed to Keystone
was recorded on November 25, 1998. That same day a Complaint was filed by Keystone
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Wasatch County (Keystone Litigation), which
included Holmes, First American, and Bank One as defendants. The Complaint, among
other things, sought to quiet title to the 323 acre parcel in Keystone. (Complaintfflj6263, R. 11.)
24.

Keystone also prepared and caused to be recorded a lis pendens relative to

the 323 acre parcel which was recorded on November 25, 1998. It is alleged that the
filing of the said lis pendens prevented Holmes from selling any lots including those in
Phase VIIA, which was the only phase ready for sale. (Complaint ^f 64, R. 11.)
25.

Holmes asserts that as a result of the lis pendens it lost all of the momentum

it had generated and lost an entire selling season. (Complaint Yff 68-70, R. 12.)
26.

The aforesaid litigation commenced by Keystone was resolved by summary

judgment which quieted title in favor of Holmes per the September 3, 1998 deed from
Cook Development, and the lis pendens was released in June 1999. (Complaint ^ 67, R.
12,180-181.)
-11-

27.

Following resolution of the Keystone Litigation in favor of Holmes, Homes

did not file a lawsuit against Keystone or Premier for their collusive actions or for
Keystone's meritless lawsuit. Instead, Holmes brought this lawsuit against Paul Cook,
Cook Development and First American. Holmes' stated reason for not pursuing claims
against Keystone is "because it has nothing, has no - no - no ability to compensate
Holmes Development." (Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing p. 26, lines 11, 1621, R. 287.)
28.

Holmes' Complaint asserts three causes of action against Paul Cook and

Cook Development: negligence, breach of warranty, and indemnification of damages
resulting from Paul Cook's, Cook Development's and First American's alleged
negligence. (Complaint, R. 1-19.)
29.

On May 18, 2000, the trial court entered summary judgment against

Holmes and in favor of First American. Holmes' claims were dismissed on several
grounds: (1) since any title defects had been cured by at least September 1998, two
months before Keystone filed its lawsuit, the alleged title defect was not a proximate
cause of Holmes' alleged injury; (2) Holmes' claims were barred by the Title Insurance
Policy; (3) the economic loss rule precluded the assertion of claims based on negligence
or negligent misrepresentation; (4) there was no reasonable expectation that Holmes
would rely on First American's conduct; and (5) Holmes was not an intended third party
beneficiary. (Summary Judgment, R. 261-264.)
-12-

30.

On August 2, 2000, the trial court entered summary judgment against

Holmes and in favor of Paul Cook and Cook Development. Holmes' claims were
dismissed on three grounds: (1) the economic loss doctrine precluded any recovery
against Paul Cook and Cook Development on Holmes' negligence claim; (2) the breach
of warranty claims were barred by the fact that any breach of warranty which may have
existed was cured before Keystone filed its lawsuit against Holmes and no damages were
alleged to have occurred prior to good title being conveyed (Le^ September 3, 1998); and
(3) Holmes' claim for indemnification of damages resulting from appellees' alleged
negligence was found to be barred as being outside the scope of the Indemnification
Agreement. (Summary Judgment, R. 266-269.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Keystone Litigation was successfully defended at the expense of First
American with title to the Property being quieted in Holmes. Regardless of whether there
was at one time a breach of warranty by Cook Development, the Property transfer was
cured prior to the time of any alleged damages arising from the Keystone Litigation and
the related lis pendens and therefore the alleged damages were not caused by any breach
of warranty. Further, even ignoring the foregoing, arguendo, the damages alleged by
Holmes for breach of warranty are not cognizable under Utah law in that Holmes'
remedies are limited to the value of any property lost plus the reasonable costs necessarily
expended defending title. Since no part of the Property was lost by Holmes, and First
-13-

American assumed the defense of the title, the trial court correctly held that Holmes had
no claim for damages based on its asserted breach of warranty.
Holmes' indemnification claim was also properly dismissed by the trial court.
Holmes' indemnification claim seeks indemnification "for the damages it has already
incurred and will continue to incur as a result of Cook Development and Paul Cook's
negligence, as well as the negligence of First American." (Complaint ^f 104, R. 18 .) The
trial court held that no cognizable claim based on negligence existed based on the First
Cause of Action against Cook or First American based OQ the economic loss rule and this
portion of the trial court's ruling (First Cause of Action) has not been challenged on
appeal. Thus, it also follows that no basis exists for indemnification of alleged negligence
damages under the Indemnification Agreement.
Even ignoring Holmes' "negligence" pleading relative to indemnification (Fifth
Cause of Action), there were no damages in any event which fell within the scope of the
provisions of the Indemnity Agreement. Further, even if the scope of the Indemnity
Agreement were broadened as to its meaning, Holmes nevertheless had good title to the
Property prior to the time the damages alleged in the Complaint occurred and therefore
there is no recoverable damage.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Holmes leave to amend
because Holmes failed to file a motion pursuant to Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and failed to provide the basis for amendment.
-14-

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON BEHALF OF COOK DEVELOPMENT
AND PAUL COOK WAS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED
In arguing that the summary judgment granted in favor of Cook should be
reversed, Holmes sets forth four (4) points in its brief among which points there is certain
overlap.2 For a more orderly response, Cook addresses Holmes' sections 1 and 3
together, addresses section 2 separately in the context of the "Extension and Modification
[sic] Agreement" ("Modification and Extension Agreement") and also separately
addresses section 4, Le. the "Indemnity Agreement."3 From a scrutiny of Holmes'
arguments, the correctness of the trial court's action in granting summary judgment is
apparent.

2

A comparison of the points at pages 32-43 of appellant's brief with the
Statement of the Issues at page 3 of its brief shows a lack of consistency. The two
sections fail to completely match up. It appears that the points argued (pages 32-43) are
broader than the Statement of the Issues.
3

In its section 2, Holmes refers to both the Modification and Extension
Agreement and the Indemnity Agreement. As noted, for ease of reference, these two are
herein separately addressed.
-15-

A.

Summary Judgment Was Proper In That Holmes Is Not Entitled To Any
Recovery Based On Breach Of The Warranty Deed From Cook Development
To Holmes.
1.

Even Assuming, Arguendo, A Breach of Warranty Existed, It Was
Cured Before Commencement Of The Keystone Litigation And
Therefore Was Not The Cause Of Any Of The Damages Alleged By
Holmes In Its Complaint.

Although the argument of Holmes under sections 1 (appellant's brief p. 32) and 3
(appellant's brief p. 38) is somewhat diffuse, to a great extent it pertains to the Fourth
Cause of Action of its Complaint, Le., "breach of warranty.M4 Apart from the paragraphs
of the Complaint incorporated by reference, the specific allegations of the Fourth Cause
of Action in Holmes' Complaint are as follows:
97.

Paul Cook and Cook Development executed a Warranty Deed and a
Special Warranty Deed in order to convey the 323 acre parcel to
Holmes.

98.

Paul Cook and Cook Development, by the terms of these two deeds,
warranted that they had the authority to convey and did in fact own
[the] 323 acre parcel that, by the terms of the deeds, they were
conveying to Holmes.

99.

Paul Cook and Cook Development did not, in fact, possess the
authority nor did they have the right to convey title to Holmes in fee
simple by virtue of the previous faulty quit claim deed prepared by
First American.

4

In section 1, Holmes also references the "Indemnity Agreement" and the
"Extension Agreement" (Le^ correctly the "Modification and Extension Agreement").
Section 3 pertains to the "Warranty Deed." As before noted, the Indemnity Agreement
and the Modification and Extension Agreement are separately addressed leaving the
"warranty" issue to be discussed under this Section A.
-16-

100. Paul Cook and Cook Development have therefore breached the
warranties represented in the Warranty Deed and the Special
Warranty Deed. These breaches has [sic] damaged Holmes in an
amount in excess of $1,000,000.00[.]
(Complaint % 97-100, R. 17.)
The foundational premise of Holmes' warranty claim is that the conveyance of the
323 acre parcel by quit claim deed from LC Associates to Cook Development was faulty
and hence the warranty deed provided thereafter in May, 1998 by Cook Development to
Holmes was breached.5 Thus, for the purpose of the summary judgment argument before
the trial court it was assumed that there was breach of warranty as alleged.
However, even assuming the existence of the alleged title problem with respect to
the 323 acre parcel, it was remedied by the special warranty deed provided to Holmes
dated September 3, 1998. The fact of this deed conveying good title was even established
by judicial determination in the Keystone Litigation.6 Thus, there is no dispute among the
parties that good title to the Property was in fact passed to Holmes no later than
September 3, 1998, prior to any of the damages alleged by Holmes.
5

Although the cited paragraphs from the Complaint also reference the "Special
Warranty Deed1' (dated September 3, 1998), there is no dispute in the record but what the
Special Warranty Deed conveyed good title.
6

It should be noted that appellees do not concede that the quit claim deed to Cook
Development was defective or that the warranty deed thereafter from Cook Development
to Holmes in May, 1998 was breached. However, for purposes of the summary judgment
motion, in order to argue from a conservative premise, it was assumed that the original
quit claim conveyance was problematic and the May, 1998 warranty deed was at one time
breached.
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In its brief at page 34, Holmes argues that Cook claims "that the eventual
successful defense of Holmes' title nullifies the breaches of the covenants referenced
above and absolves Cook of any liability for said breaches." This is not a complete and
accurate characterization. What Holmes misses in its argument is the fundamental
proposition that based on Holmes' own allegations in its Complaint, Holmes was not
damaged by any alleged breach of warranty.
Although Holmes makes some general reference to damages, (e.g., the loss of limb
and restoration footnote referenced at page 36 of its brief)7, the matter is governed by the
factual record which is essentially comprised of Holmes' Complaint. For example,
Holmes alleges that Premier purported to sell the 323 acre parcel in dispute to Keystone
with the deed being recorded on November 25, 1998. (Complaint «f| 62, R. 11.) At
paragraph 63 of its Complaint (R. 11), Holmes further alleges that a lis pendens was also
recorded on November 25, 1998 by Keystone which "prevented Holmes from selling any
lots, including those in Phase VII A, which was the only phase ready for sale." (R. 11.)
Thereafter in its Complaint Holmes further alleges the impact of the lis pendens:
66.
Because of the lis pendens. Holmes was faced with the unfortunate
dilemma of trying to sell lots with the risk that potential buyers and the real
7

Holmes severed-limb analogy is faulty. For example, if there were damages
analogous to a severed limb (which there are not under the economic loss doctrine), then
to make the analogy more accurate one would have to assume that Keystone severed the
limb, not Cook or First American. Clearly, under this analogy, neither Cook nor First
American are the cause of the severed limb as it is a matter between Holmes and
Keystone.
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estate community would learn that Lake Creek Farms was in trouble and
that lots could not be purchased because of the cloud over Holmes['] title to
the land, a cloud that was ultimately generated by First American's
incompetence and clerical errors.
67.
The Keystone litigation was eventually resolved through summary
judgment and the lis pendens released in late June of 1999.
68.
However, by that time the damage was done. As a result of the lis
pendens Holmes lost all of the momentum it had generated and the prime
1999 selling season was lost.
69.
During the pendency of the Keystone litigation, Holmes was further
forced to make interest and principal payments on its indebtedness without
the benefit of the cash flow it anticipated it would enjoy from the sale of the
Phase VIIA lots.
70.
Holmes lost an entire selling season as a result of the lis pendens,
and its master plan for Lake Creek Farms effectively lost an entire year.
Holmes did not sell a single lot during the pendency of the Keystone
litigation.
(Complaint ^ 66-70, R. 12, emphasis added.)
Per its own allegations, Holmes' alleged damage resulted from the lis pendens
filed over two and one-half (2 lA) months after the recording of the September 3, 1998
special warranty deed which conveyed good title. The asserted damage resulted from the
culpable actions of Keystone, not Cook. Thus, even assuming that Cook breached
warranties per the May, 1998 warranty deed, there is no damage resulting therefrom in
order to sustain Holmes' claim related to the lis pendens.
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2.

Even If, Arguendo, The Damages Alleged Did Not Relate To The Lis
Pendens Or Keystone's Frivolous Quiet Title Action, Such Damages
Are Not Cognizable Under Utah Law In Any Event

As set forth, supra, the damages actually alleged by Holmes were due to the lis
pendens and Keystone, not Cook. Apart from the forgoing, the nature of the damages
alleged (i.e., alleged loss of a selling season and inability to sell lots) are not cognizable
under a breach of warranty claim pursuant to Utah law.
At pages 38-40 of appellant's brief Holmes argues it is entitled to damages for the
alleged loss of a selling season even though title to the Property was successfully
defended by First American. Holmes cites to no authority permitting the recovery of
damages based on such a theory. The authorities cited by Holmes, as well as other Utah
authority, holds to the contrary, Le. that damages for breach of warranty are limited to the
value of any property lost as a result of the breach of warranty plus the reasonable
expense incurred in the defense of the property. Holmes has no cognizable damages in
that good title was successfully defended.8 Holmes has not made and indeed has no claim
for reasonable expenses incurred in the defense of the Property9 as such defense was

8

This case should be distinguished from those cases wherein clear title was not
successfully defended and as a consequence the value of the subject property was
reduced. In such cases damages would be measured by the value of the subject property
which was lost.
9

No allegation is made in the Complaint for attorneys' fees expended in the
process of clearing Holmes' title to the Property in relation to the breach of warranty
claim. Title was defended by First American.
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undertaken by First American pursuant to a title insurance policy purchased by Cook
Development.
Holmes argues that the Utah case of Creason v. Peterson, 470 P.2d 403 (Utah
1970) somehow stands for the proposition that damages such as those alleged by Holmes
are recoverable in a breach of warranty action. This assertion is not supported by
Creason. In Creason, the plaintiff purchased certain real property from the defendant
pursuant to a warranty deed. Id. at 403. After it was discovered that the legal description
of the property purchased did not comport with the actual property lines as established by
fence lines,10 plaintiff worked to correct the discrepancies by obtaining and giving quit
claim deeds to his neighbors. Id. Plaintiff then sued to recover his attorneys fees
necessary to clear up the title. The Supreme Court of Utah held that in this case plaintiff
was entitled to an award of damages for the reasonable expenses of clearing up the title.
The only types of damages addressed in Creason are those resulting from a loss of
property and the reasonable expenses of clearing up the title. Id. at 405-06. Of course,
neither type of damage was alleged by Holmes in the context of a breach of warranty
claim. The dicta of Creason cited by Holmes does not support Holmes' theory of
causation and damages.
Holmes also argues that Van Cott v. Jacklin, 226 P. 460 (Utah 1924) somehow
supports its theory of damages. To the contrary, Van Cott supports Cook's contention
10

The trial court held that any actual loss of property was negligible.
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that clear title and the cost of clearing title are the only remedies available to Holmes.
Van Cott involved the loss of a portion of the real property warranted. Id. at 461. The
trial court in Van Cott found that there was no breach of warranty because the parties
were aware of the title discrepancy when the warranty deed was executed. The Utah
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the matter for trial as to the issue of
damages. Id. at 464. The Van Cott opinion explains at great length the measure of
damages for breach of warranty, concluding that such damages are measured as a
proportional part of the money paid and a "reasonable sum as attorney fees." Id. at 46264. In discussing the measure of damages the opinion does not give any credence to the
theory of damages asserted by Holmes.11
Other Utah authority limiting damages in a breach of warranty action include
Forrer v. Sather. 595 P.2d 1306 (Utah 1979), in which it was held that in an action for
"breach of covenant against encumbrances", the "damages" recoverable were limited by
the amount which was fairly and necessarily paid to extinguish the encumbrance, not to
exceed, however, the amount of the purchase money paid by grantees to grantors, plus
attorney fees reasonably incurred in contesting encumbrance, together with interest at
legal rate from date of eviction and costs of court.

11

See also, George H. Lowe Co. v.

Holmes' initial brief devotes a paragraph of argument relative to the facts of
Van Cott; however, notwithstanding all of the argument, this case continues to stand for
the proposition that the only allowable damages for breach of warranty when title is
cleared are those expenses necessarily incurred to clear the title.
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Simmons Ware-House Co.. 117 P. 874 (Utah 1911) (if an incumbrance is extinguished by
the purchaser, he may recover a reasonable price necessarily paid for that purpose with
interest if this does not exceed the amount paid the covenator or the value of the
property).
Holmes has good title to the Property which was successfully defended at the
expense of First American. Under applicable law respecting damages in breach of
warranty cases, Holmes is entitled to nothing more from Cook.12
B.

Summary Judgment Was Proper In That Holmes Is Not Entitled To Any
Recovery Based On Breach Of The Modification And Extension Agreement.
In its brief at 37-38, Holmes asserts that there was a breach of a Modification and

Extension Agreement; in particular paragraph 3 thereof. First, no claim was made in the
Complaint that is based on the Modification and Extension Agreement. Since such a
claim is not part of the Complaint below, it cannot be an issue on appeal.
Second, even if, arguendo, it was part of the case below, there is no basis for such
a claim. Paragraph 3 of the Modification and Extension Agreement states as follows:
3.

Seller's Representations and Warranties.

Seller hereby represents and warrants that it has full legal and
equitable title to the Property, subject only to the liens, charges, restrictions
or encumbrances either of record or disclosed in the Original Agreement.

12

Holmes may have claims against Keystone for the damages proximately caused
by Keystone, but this is not a matter before this Court.
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Because this language covers in all material and practical respects that which is
encompassed by the warranties of a warranty deed, the argument under Section A, supra,
is applicable to this paragraph. As set forth, supra. Holmes had good title as of
September 3, 1998. The alleged damages arose from Keystone's filing of a lis pendens in
late November, 1998 related to its spurious quiet title action. This is an issue between
Holmes and Keystone and not Cook.
C.

Summary Judgment Was Proper In That Holmes Is Not Entitled To Any
Recovery Based On The Indemnity Agreement.
Holmes attempts to create or find a claim based on an Indemnity Agreement dated

effective May 19, 1998. Again, the argument of Holmes on appeal does not comport with
the allegations of the Complaint. In its allegations in the Fifth Cause of Action of the
Complaint (apart from the incorporation of paragraphs), Holmes asserts that:
102.

Holmes has demanded that Cook Development and Paul Cook
indemnify it and hold it harmless from the damages it has sustained
by virtue of its purchase of the Lake Creek Farms development and
arising out of the faulty deeds.

103.

Paul Cook and Cook Development have failed to honor the
obligations imposed on them by the Indemnity Agreement and in so
doing have breached the obligations each owe to Holmes.

104.

Holmes is entitled to be indemnified per the Indemnity Agreement
for the damages it has already incurred and will continue to incur as
a result of Cook Development and Paul Cook's negligence, as well
as the negligence of First American.

(Complaint^ 102-104, R. 17-18; emphasis added.)
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In its Complaint Holmes makes no allegations concerning physical injury to the
Property or to any person. The allegations pertain strictly to purported economic loss.
Because the purported damage basis is economic, Holmes is not entitled to any
recovery based on negligence. In American Towers Owners Ass'n. v. CCI Mechanical
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court underscores the applicability of
the "economic loss rule" stating that "in other words, economic damages are not
recoverable in negligence absent physical property damage or bodily injury." (Citation
omitted.)13 American Towers at 1189. The Utah Supreme Court states that "the policy
reasons supporting the economic loss rule are sound." Id. at 1190. For example, in the
context of products, the Utah Supreme Court states that "contract principles resolve issues
when the product does not meet the user's expectations, while tort principles resolve
issues when the product is unsafe to person or property." Id. In Maack v. Resource
Design & Construction. Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994) it is recognized that the
"economic loss rule" is the majority rule. Id. at 579-80. As set forth in East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.. 476 U.S. 858, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 90 L.
Ed.2d 865 (1986), the "economic loss rule" is the majority position that one may not

13

American Towers also cites approvingly the cases of Maack v. Resource
Design & Construction. Inc.. 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994) and Schafirv. Harrigan,
879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994) which articulate the applicability of the "economic loss
rule" in negligence actions.
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recover "economic" losses under a theory of non-intentional tort.14 Id. at 476 U.S. 86675, 106 S. Ct. 2300-04.
It is important to consider that the language in the Indemnity Agreement, infra,
does not specifically reference "negligence." Indeed, as a matter of law the trial court
ruled that no negligence claim exists against First American or Cook per the First Cause
of Action. Any damage purportedly covered by the indemnity (Fifth Cause of Action)
must, however, be damage cognizable under the law since there is no language in the
indemnity specifically encompassing negligence. Thus, the type of negligence damage
alleged by Holmes, Le, economic loss, simply provides no basis for recovery under the
indemnity.15
Ignoring, arguendo. Holmes' own pleading which premises the indemnity claim
solely on negligence, there is still no basis for an indemnity claim and summary judgment
was proper.

14

Holmes' Complaint includes a specific claim for negligence (First Cause of
Action) against Paul Cook, Cook Development and First American. This negligence
claim was dismissed by the trial court and its dismissal was not argued by Holmes on this
appeal. If the First Cause of Action in the Complaint had been argued on appeal by
Holmes, the argument in this section relative to the economic loss rule would be
applicable.
15

Since it has been determined as a matter of law that Holmes has no negligence
claim against Cook or First American, the indemnification claim based on the asserted
negligence of Cook and First American must also necessarily fail. Macris & Assoc, v.
Neways, 200 UT 93, _ P.3d _ (Utah 2000) (claim preclusion).
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The paragraphs from the Indemnity Agreement relied upon by Holmes are as
follows:16
1.

Indemnification. Cook Development and Paul Cook shall
indemnify, defend and hold harmless Holmes, its successors and
assigns from and against:
(a)

Any and all claims that arise from, or are in any way related to,
Seller's acquisition, ownership or development of the Covered
Property prior to the date of this Agreement, except for those claims
covered by the title insurance policy to be purchased pursuant to the
Purchase Agreement;

(b)

Any damage, loss or deficiency resulting from any
misrepresentation, breach of warranty or nonfulfillment of any
covenant or agreement on the part of Cook Development under any
agreement or any other document executed in connection with
Holmes' purchase of the Covered Property; and

(c)

All actions, suits, proceedings, demands, settlements, assessments,
judgments, costs, investigation expenses, interest, penalties, legal
fees and expenses incident to the transactions between Cook
Development and Holmes or involving or in connection with the
Covered Property.

(R. 180-181.) Even if negligence is not considered the alleged basis for Holmes'
indemnity claim, reliance on these paragraphs provides no claim for Holmes.
First, indemnification normally protects the indemnitee from claims brought
against it by others, Le^ third parties. Holmes does not allege in its Complaint that it
seeks damages because of the meritorious claims of others. What Holmes attempts to do
16

These specific paragraphs were not identified in the Complaint per se. As set
forth supra, the Complaint only referenced a claim to indemnity damages based on
"negligence."
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by its argument is to turn the indemnity away from a hold harmless type of provision to a
contract bestowing a direct, primary right of recovery. Thus, Holmes' so-called
"indemnity1' claim is really not a true claim for indemnity and therefore not proper.
Second, ignoring the foregoing and assuming the indemnity is a contract for direct,
affirmative claims, with respect to paragraph (a) of the Indemnity Agreement it is limited
to "claims that arise . . . prior to the date of this Agreement,1' Le^ prior to May 19, 1998.
As set forth, supra, Holmes only alleges damages due to the lis pendens filed in late
November, 1998 by Keystone. This has nothing to do with anything pre-May 19, 1998.
Even if one were to accept Holmes' implicit broader reading of paragraph (a), Le^
that it also covers for some reason damages arising after May 19, 1998, Holmes is still not
entitled to any relief. Holmes had good title in September, 1998 which was prior to the
filing of the lis pendens. There simply is no cognizable damage.
Third, there is no claim based on paragraph (b). Again, the only damages alleged
in the Complaint arise from the lis pendens. Since Holmes had good title months prior
thereto, there was no "damage, loss or deficiency" due to "misrepresentation, breach of
warranty or nonfulfillment of any covenant or agreement. ..." See also argument under
breach of warranty, supra at Section I, Subsection A.
Fourth, as to paragraph (c) of the Indemnity Agreement there is also no basis for a
claim. Again, per the Complaint, the only damage was due to the Keystone lis pendens.
Paragraph (c) does not by its wording reference general or all types of damages. It
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enumerates certain categories which do not help Holmes in this case. Holmes was in fact
specifically protected relative to "actions" and "suits" as well as "proceedings, demands,"
"settlements" and "assessments" referenced in paragraph c by the successful title defense
provided by First American. The Complaint makes no claim relative to "judgments,
costs, investigation expenses," or to "interest" unrelated to the effects of the lis pendens.
As to legal fees and expenses, a defense was provided by First American pursuant to the
title insurance purchased by Cook Development and nothing in the record quantifies any
other fees and expenses.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED
HOLMES' REQUEST TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT
Holmes filed no Rule 15, Utah R. Civ. P., motion requesting leave to amend its
Complaint. Instead, Holmes merely set forth such a request in the body of its
memorandum in opposition to the Cook motion. The trial court rejected Holmes request
for leave to amend its Complaint.
It is well recognized that the proper way to amend a pleading is by filing "a Rule
15 motion to amend with an attachment of the proposed amendment or new pleading." 3
Moore's Federal Practice, ^ 15.7 (3d ed. 2000). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and
other courts have recognized that a motion to amend must satisfy the requirements of
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Rule 7(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b), which
has been adopted verbatim in Utah's rule 7(b), requires all motions to "state with
particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 7(b). The Tenth Circuit has stated based upon this rule that:
[A] request for leave to amend must give adequate notice to the district court and
to the opposing party of the basis of the proposed amendment before the court is
required to recognize that a motion for leave to amend is before it.
Calderon v. Kansas Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services, 181 F.3d 1180, 1186-87
(10th Cir. 1999). In Calderon the court concluded that an abbreviated request for leave,
"lacking a statement of the grounds for amendment and dangling at the end of her
memorandum, did not rise to the level of a motion for leave to amend." Id. at 1187.
Since the Utah rules "were fashioned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is
proper that [this Court] examine decisions under the Federal Rules to determine the
meaning thereof." Winegar v. Slim Olson. Inc., 252 P.2d 205, 207 (Utah 1953).
Holmes, as in the Calderon case, merely set forth a naked request at the end of its
opposition memorandum with no other guidance for leave to amend, which is not an
appropriate motion under Rules 7(b) and 15. Therefore, the trial court properly denied

17

Rule 4-501(1 )(A), Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, requires that "All
motions . . . be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities ..." Thus, it is
contemplated that a separate motion and memorandum be filed and that such be filed so
that an appropriate opposition can be submitted in the full light of day. In this case
neither a motion nor a supporting memorandum was filed. For these reasons no motion to
amend exists in the record.
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Holmes' request. This Court "will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend
a Complaint absent a clear abuse of discretion." Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 922
(Utah 1994). Holmes has presented no evidence of abuse in this case and none exists.18
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Cook respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
District Court's granting the summary judgment.
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18

Further, Holmes factually alleged that the damages arose after September 3,
1998. Even if an amendment were to encompass some other legal theory, the facts
already alleged are nevertheless fatal to the causation for any claim that could be set forth
against Cook.
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